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Introduction

P

ROFESSOR SANDEEP GOPALAN has written a provocative Article.1 His argument begins with the proposition that there is a subset of
white-collar crimes “involving corporate fiduciaries who make bad decisions at the expense of shareholders (corporate governance offenses).”2 Further, for a subset of these offenses that do not involve
fraud as moral wrongfulness,3 he argues that “[i]rrespective of the theoretical justification underpinning the decision to criminalize, imprisonment must not follow conviction. The conviction, despite the lack
of incarceration, and the consequential sanctions likely to be imposed
on the wrongdoer are sufficient to satisfy the three main justifications
for criminalization: [deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation].”4
Gopalan thus presents a stimulating argument; to the extent his goal
is to foster intellectual discourse, it is a resounding success.
While I applaud Professor Gopalan for his courage, I find his thesis uneasy. Some might be tempted to dismiss his arguments as simply
an apology for corporate criminals, but I have given his arguments the
seriousness and careful reading they deserve. This Essay summarizes
my reactions and is structured into three principal sections. Part I argues that the Article’s overall theoretical framework is implausible: it
delimits a category of offenses that has the dubious distinction of being both narrow and unclear at the same time, falls prey to commodifying human behavior through a rational actor model, and
fundamentally offers anemic remedies. Part II argues the Article’s
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. I thank the editors of the University
of San Francisco Law Review for inviting me to write this response.
1. See Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 459 (2009).
2. Id. at 461.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 462.
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case study, the putative “martydom” of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, is ultimately unconvincing and unfortunately serves to exhibit
many of the Article’s theoretical weaknesses. Part III concludes by addressing some minor difficulties I had with various propositions in the
Article.

I.

An Implausible Framework

The Article’s overall theoretical framework is implausible for
three principal reasons. First, it delimits a category of offenses that has
the dubious distinction of being both narrow and unclear at the same
time. Second, it falls prey to commodifying human behavior through
a rational actor model. Third, the construct ultimately offers anemic
remedies.
The category of offenses that the Article seeks to address is, oddly
enough, both narrowly defined and imprecise. As a baseline, consider
the category of crimes to which Gopalan’s thesis applies:
This Article is restricted to white-collar crimes involving corporate
fiduciaries who make bad decisions at the expense of shareholders
(corporate governance offenses). It does not address white-collar
crimes that have a moral wrongfulness component, such as tax evasion, bribery, perjury, extortion, fraud, and embezzlement.5

But even this short paragraph engenders more questions than it answers. First, assuming one is able to draw a magic line to delineate
other white-collar offenses from corporate governance offenses—
which is by no means evident6—the latter category is regulated by
state corporate or agency laws that only very rarely have criminal
enforcement.
To the extent the Article is talking about securities laws, it has to
tread very carefully for two reasons. First, securities laws are not concerned with fiduciaries per se, but rather focus on any person committing fraud. Second, securities laws on their own terms require mens
rea—they are not strict liability statutes. Simply reading the principal
antifraud statute, Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, reveals these realities:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
5. Id. at 461.
6. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997) (“‘[M]oral
wrongfulness’ . . . is present if the conduct made criminal is viewed by a consensus of
society as immoral or in violation of a moral norm.”).
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....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.7

The implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5 similarly speaks of “device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” and “fraud or deceit.”8 As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “§ 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or
deception.”9
It goes almost without saying that showing fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires some showing of mens rea. Similarly,
Section 13(b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, requiring appropriate accounting systems and prohibiting the falsification
of documents, requires that the defendant have acted “knowingly.”10
Beyond these general requirements which apply to both civil and
criminal cases, Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act imposes criminal penalties only if the violation is made “willfully” or “willfully and knowingly.”11 As such, there is even further protection for defendants in
such cases.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (emphasis added).
8. Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
9. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2006) (“No person shall knowingly circumvent or
knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).”).
11. Section 32(a) states, in relevant part:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section
78dd–1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which
is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this
chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made,
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Even a simple glance at the securities laws thus reveals that they
neither apply strictly to fiduciaries, nor impose liability without mens
rea on the defendant’s part. As such, statements to the effect that
“[t]here must be a fundamental distinction based on the moral
blameworthiness of conduct if our distinctions between criminal and
civil sanctions are to have any merit”12 seem incongruous. Even more
puzzling is Gopalan’s caveat:
Crimes with a mens rea element are not problematic; therefore, this
Article addresses only those offenses where the defendants were
most likely acting in the belief that their conduct was legal. This is
particularly plausible in cases involving the interpretation of complex accounting rules or risky business decisions.13

Similarly, he suggests that “the conduct at issue only invites attention
because it was seen to be too aggressive by regulators, when the actors
themselves only believed that they were engaging in legitimately risky
enterprise.”14 But the statutes under which white-collar offenders are
charged, by their own terms, require mens rea—to wit, the specific
charges against Jeff Skilling as well described in Gopalan’s Article.15
So unless the Article assumes that defendants are charged willy-nilly
without a statutory basis, its theoretical construct is at best problematic. In a similar vein, Gopalan suggests that “[m]oral wrongfulness is
essential to criminalization for corporate governance offenses; otherwise, determinations about culpability rest only on ex post loss rather
than clear guidelines for behavior ex ante.”16 The securities statutes
focus precisely on this question, however, by requiring the mens rea
necessary for fraud.
Ironically, it is perhaps the Article itself that deemphasizes morality along two dimensions. First, it refers to morality as malleable across
time and therefore of limited value as a litmus test for the imposition
any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (emphasis added).
12. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 467.
13. Id. at 466.
14. Id. at 464; cf. id. at 469 (“Given the lack of clarity as to what underlying moral
norm has been violated by a particular alleged crime, and because the precise complexities
are hard to understand, there is likely to be a great deal of dissonance about moral wrongfulness and culpability.”).
15. See id. at 488 (Charges included wire fraud, securities fraud, false statements to
auditors, and insider trading.).
16. Id. at 469; see also id. at 503 (“Criminalizing risky actions undertaken by corporate
fiduciaries confuses ex post harm with moral wrongfulness.”); id. (“[S]ince white-collar
wrongs are not always morally wrong the criminal law’s expressive and coercive powers are
seriously undermined by the crude application of criminal sanctions.”).
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of criminal sanctions.17 Second and more subtly, by suggesting that
moral opprobrium is an insufficient condition for criminalization,
Gopalan seems to suggest that non-consensual harm should be present as well.18 For instance, note how prominently harm appears in
the following passage:
It is important to understand what constitutes harm. As is typically
used in the criminal law, “criminal harm” can involve bodily harm,
as well as social harm involving collective losses. The first kind is
unproblematic and the validity of the state’s criminalization of
such conduct is not seriously disputed. The second might also be acceptable in cases where the conduct is non-consensual and involves third
parties suffering without the ability to avoid the harm.19

The argument thus appears to be that “bodily harm” should be
criminalized in all cases, whereas “social harm” should only be
criminalized in specific instances where there are non-consensual, unavoidable losses. Yet this is a framework created by the Article, not by
the statutes. Even ignoring this problem, there is sufficient non-consensual loss in white-collar crime—on Gopalan’s own terms, he observes that the “horror stories of families being deprived of their
savings by the actions of corporate executives have shattered the myth
that white-collar crime is victimless.”20
Another problem with the Article’s theoretical ambition is that it
tries to commodify human behavior using a rational actor model typical of traditional law and economics scholarship.21 Consider a particularly telling passage which purportedly seeks to get inside the mind of
the would-be white-collar criminal:
The most frequently advanced justification for criminalization is
deterrence—offenders will be deterred from committing criminal
acts if the benefits from committing those acts do not exceed the
probability of being caught multiplied by the cost of punishment
following prosecution. Thus, a rational actor will trade off the expected value of committing the criminal act against two variables:
the probability of being caught and the punishment after convic17. See, e.g., id. at 471 (“The fact that our perceptions about morality are capable of
temporal change and that conduct regarded as morally wrongful or harmful during a certain timeframe might be regarded as perfectly acceptable at another timeframe must give
us further pause for thought when we see the temptation to criminalize.”).
18. See id. (“Moreover, moral wrongfulness is not an automatic justification for
criminalization: several morally wrongful acts might cause no harm in many circumstances
involving consent.”).
19. Id. at 473 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at 472.
21. See, e.g., id. at 478 (“In sum, monetizing the disutility suffered by the white-collar
criminal upon conviction offers clarity about the sufficiency of the punishment function
served by conviction alone.”).
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tion. If the probability of being caught is low, the criminal act
might still seem attractive even if the punishment is high. The
same principle applies if the punishment is low and the probability
of being caught is high.22

One is reminded of well-known work in law and economics that assumes an inverse linear correlation between enforcement efforts and
the degree of punishment.23 Unfortunately, though, there is neither
empirical analysis nor even raw data to support these assertions. To be
sure, Gopalan does provide some equations to back up his claim.24
The equations—based on variables such as total disutility, the
probability of conviction, the length of imprisonment, the disutility of
imprisonment, and the disutility of conviction—do at first glance look
impressive. When readers go through them, however, they realize that
the numbers assumed for these variables are instrumentally chosen in
a self-serving manner—assumptions thrown into the pseudo-math typical of traditional law and economics scholarship.25
The lack of empirical support and use of pseudo-mathematics is
entirely unsurprising. Depictions of individuals as utility-maximizing
automatons stretches common sense notions of how people behave:
behavioral research suggests that a high certainty of punishment is
perhaps the most effective way of deterring individuals from anti-social behavior. As Dan Kahan has shown in the context of street crime,
an “order-maintenance” strategy, where law enforcement places an
emphasis on visible responses to criminal activity, is the most effective
strategy.26 As Kahan summarizes:
When public deterrence predominates, individuals are much less
likely to perceive that criminality is widespread. Moreover, when
they feel reassured that law enforcement is adequate, law-abiders
are more likely to view private precautions as worthwhile, and less
likely to see such precautions as signs that those around them lack
confidence in the efficacy of law. These attitudes are likely to sustain norms of private behavior that reduce the need for expenditures on public deterrence. In short, a mix tilted toward public law
enforcement rather than private precautions would be more likely to generate
a low crime-rate equilibrium at any given price of crime.27
22. Id. at 474.
23. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 483 (2004)
(“[T]he sanction is governed by a fundamental probability-related multiplier—the sanction
must equal the harm multiplied by the inverse of the probability of its imposition.”).
24. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 475–76.
25. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV.
303 (2005).
26. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 371 (1997).
27. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
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This is a far cry from commodifying human behavior into an implausible rational actor model. As scholars have noted, “what is needed is
not a theory of ‘crime’ (let alone a theory of ‘economic crime’) but
theories of human behavior.”28
Third and finally, the Article’s framework offers anemic remedies
that ultimately remain unsatisfying. Gopalan’s central point is apparently that “[c]onviction inevitably results in consequential sanctions
ranging from shaming to legal impediments and denial of privileges.”29 Yet each of these “sanctions”—shaming, legal impediments,
and denial of presumably social privileges—when examined carefully
reveals itself to be relatively mild.
To begin with, shaming unfortunately cannot be taken too seriously. Gopalan seems to suggest that shaming will work because defendants are concerned about their image in society. He postulates
that corporate governance offenders are more likely to be “reputation
conscious and have a high rate of disutility for conviction alone . . .
because their very livelihood is tied to reputation.”30 But once again,
no evidence is offered to adduce this point: will often arrogant and
egotistical miscreants really appreciate shame? Another glaring problem with the shame sanction is, ironically enough, created by the Article’s own thesis: if the activities under question are not morally
wrongful, then why would any defendant feel any shame? After all, if
one hews to the argument, then they have not done anything morally
wrong.
To his credit, Gopalan himself seems to recognize the internal
inconsistency with his shaming argument. But his attempt to overcome it simply shifts away from shaming to his next putative sanction,
legal impediments:
If offenders charged with violating accounting rules do not believe
that their conduct was wrongful, then they are likely to be angered
by the imposition of a shame sanction rather than feel remorse.
Even if they change their actions following the shaming because
they realize the disutility created, this reformation is unlikely to be
sustainable. Resentment and anger are likely to motivate them to
find new ways to break the rules. This problem could be partially ad-

28.
ment of
29.
30.

Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the EnforceEconomic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 223 (1965).
Gopalan, supra note 1, at 480.
Id. at 477.
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dressed by incapacitating them from holding similar positions of trust
through the use of legal impediments.31

The argument thus seems to be: shame might not work, so we should
shift to legal impediments.
But what are these so-called impediments, and how meaningful
are they? As far as I can discern the argument, they fall into two categories: (1) banning defendants from roles as fiduciaries, and (2) monetary fines and disgorgement.32 In turn, each of these reveals itself
unsatisfactory.
The first category relies on the assertion that “[c]onviction is sufficiently liberty depriving for corporate governance offenders insofar
as it destroys the ability to hold fiduciary positions, thereby eliminating the possibility for further social harm.”33 Consider some
illustrations:
For example, if the offender is a lawyer, he may lose his license. He
may also be suspended from practicing before the SEC. If she is the
CEO of the company she founded, she must demit that office. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, under section 1105,
the SEC has the power without going to court to issue officer and
director bars as part of a cease-and-desist proceeding.34

While these sanctions might in the abstract sound plausible, they are
woefully inadequate sanctions for white-collar crime. Gopalan suggests that “[s]uch legal impediments to the offender holding offices
involving trust can be finely calibrated to achieve incapacitation in
much the same way that jail does.”35 But I am at a loss to understand
how this “finely calibrated” feat will be accomplished. Is an adequate
societal response to an individual who has defrauded investors of millions or billions of dollars simply to disallow that person from serving
as a fiduciary? Might such mild sanctions offend basic notions of
proportionality?
The second category of legal impediments, fines and disgorgement, also reveals itself inadequate. Gopalan advocates fines by relying
“on work by Gary Becker, whose economics-based approach showed
31. Id. at 485 (emphasis added); cf. id. at 483 (“Even if some offenders are not affected by shaming, other observers might see the disutility of the alleged offense and modify their behavior.”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 474 (“Decoupling blame from punishment also recognizes the reality that conviction alone is sufficient punishment. Assuming further punishment is necessary, state-punishment [sic] could be restricted to fines and impediments to holding
positions of trust.”).
33. Id. at 504.
34. Id. at 479.
35. Id. at 482–83.
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that stringent fines were preferable to imprisonment.”36 But even if
one were to accept Becker’s Chicago School approach, it is much
more nuanced than Gopalan makes it out to be. Consider, for instance, Becker’s conclusion that “fines cannot be relied on exclusively
where the harm exceeds the resources of offenders, and fines would
have to be supplemented with prison terms or other punishments in
order to discourage offenses optimally.”37 This would seem to be precisely the type of situation white-collar crime engenders. Gopalan additionally suggests the possibility of “an order to disgorge and by
taking back ill-gotten gains.”38 This sanction perhaps comes closest to
actually meting out punishment, but is not sufficient. For instance,
how would this disgorgement compare to the defendant’s overall financial net worth? Would fines and disgorgement, even combined, be
sufficient to discourage white-collar crime? Perhaps the Article might
have some responses to these questions, but they are regrettably not
even broached.
After shaming and legal impediments, we arrive finally at the
third category of sanctions; the denial of privileges, which would presumably be enforced extra-legally by the defendant’s peer group and
broader society.39 The most obvious manifestation would be the fact
that private parties would not want to hire a convicted white-collar
criminal; in other words, the “significant detriment in terms of loss of
employment opportunities and social exclusion” experienced (in
other words, disutility of conviction).40 Other social sanctions could
include “shaming, withholding of esteem, shunning, and negative voting by investors and other market participants . . . .”41 All of this may
be fine as far as it goes, but these extra-legal denials are subject to the
proportionality critique discussed in the context of legal sanctions; for
instance, does society really think that loss of earnings power or more
36. Id. at 475.
37. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
196 (1968).
38. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 480.
39. See, e.g., id. at 477–78 (“Conviction also triggers consequential sanctions, such as
shaming, by emboldening third parties to enforce social norms on offenders.”); id. at 484
(“Conviction serves as a focal point for shaming in that it emboldens individuals to impose
social sanctions.”).
40. Id. at 481; see also id. at 477 (“If earning capacity is destroyed or substantially diminished, the conviction itself would satisfy the punishment function.”); id. at 481 (“Corporate governance offenders are likely to experience significant detriment in terms of loss
of employment opportunities and social exclusion and might internalize the values sought
to be conveyed by the law even without going to jail.”).
41. Id.
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nebulous social punishments such as “withholding of esteem” are sufficient remedy for the havoc wreaked by white-collar offenders?
In addition, the Article seems to suggest that the earning capacity
of white-collar criminals should make them amenable to more lenient
punishment. After all, according to this line of thought, “[u]nlike the
common criminal who may not have a similarly predictable earning
capacity and therefore may not suffer the same extent of monetary
loss from a conviction, this loss ought to serve the deterrence function
. . . .”42 Whether or not one wants to argue that earnings should be a
determining factor as to whether a white-collar offender goes to jail,
such a stance is at the very least inconsistent in that it seems to contradict a point made a few sentences later; namely, that “[t]here is no
normative justification for treating criminal behavior by those of a
high social status differently from crimes committed by the hoi polloi.
A murder committed by a person from a higher class is still murder,
and to define crimes based on economic status alone makes little
sense.”43 But isn’t this precisely what the Article is doing when it suggests more lenient sanctions for white-collar offenders?
In the end, it is no surprise that the remedies the Article proposes
are weak. In one of the most telling passages in the Article, Gopalan
argues that “[c]orporate governance crimes involve harm, and some
even involve harm on a massive scale such as that caused by the bankruptcy of Enron. However, this harm is the price of capitalism and there
are other mechanisms that can tackle it more efficiently than imprisonment.”44 While he is to be commended for being forthright about
his position, it evinces a desire to paint the harm caused by whitecollar defendants as small; of course, with minimal harm should come
minimal sanction. Many, however, believe that corporate crime is precisely not the “price of capitalism”45—it is a perversion of capitalism,
and as such should be addressed with sanctions appropriate to the
degree of the transgression against our economic system.

II.

Skilling as “Martyr”?

The Article’s case study, the putative “martyrdom” of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, is ultimately unconvincing and unfortunately
serves to exhibit many of the theoretical weaknesses illustrated above.
One does not even need to look beyond the Article’s title, “Skilling’s
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
Id.
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Martyrdom”46 to get a sense of what Gopalan’s argument will be. Unfortunately, even on the terms Gopalan presents them—presumably
in the best light for his “martyr”—the example hardly helps the thesis,
and perhaps even detracts from it.
To his credit, Gopalan outlines upfront what he is trying to
achieve by devoting so much time and attention to the Skilling case:
As the Skilling case demonstrates in the following pages, it is unduly optimistic to suppose that public perceptions of moral wrongfulness are nuanced enough to separate conduct that is merely
risky from that which is criminal, and the dangers are exacerbated
in the context of corporate criminal conduct due to the infiltration
of negative emotions like envy and resentment.47

In line with this objective, Skilling’s actions are cast in a surprisingly
benign light. According to Gopalan, Skilling’s actions “were, at worst,
bad business judgments.”48 His conduct “was, at worst, an aggressive
interpretation of existing law”49 and his statements “remarkably like
puffery rather than criminal fraud.”50 Readers are asked “[w]here is
the ‘fraudulent’ action undertaken by Skilling to achieve the corporate goal of achieving earnings?”51 and, perhaps most remarkably,
“what is the point of sending the excessively optimistic CEO to jail or
imposing a fine?”52
This description may strike those familiar with the Enron tragedy
as, to put it mildly, strange. Much closer to reality is the government’s
position:
[T]he indictment alleged that, starting in late 1999, Skilling
spearheaded a massive conspiracy to deceive investors about Enron’s financial health by manipulating the company’s financial results and lying about the performance of its businesses. . . . [T]he
conspiracy’s objective had been to pump up Enron’s stock price
artificially by regularly reporting financial information that met or
exceeded Wall Street analysts’ expectations, trumpeting Enron’s
successes, and concealing its failures.53

More specifically, the five principal areas of fraud—fudging the accounting of a special purpose entity, manipulating reserve accounts,
46. Id. at 459.
47. Id. at 468.
48. Id. at 492; see also id. at 464 (lamenting that Skilling was convicted “for bad business judgment devoid of moral wrongfulness”); id. at 490 (“In some cases they were bad
business decisions based on hindsight, but were they worthy of imprisonment?”).
49. Id. at 503.
50. Id. at 490.
51. Id. at 502.
52. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 488–89.
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misrepresenting the Wholesale business, hiding the losses of the Retail business, and covering up the failures of the broadband business54—one is hard-pressed to treat them as merely bad business
judgment, risk-taking, or excessive optimism. This is even before
broaching the litany of misrepresentations to investors.55 Reading
Gopalan’s description and attempt to treat these activities as modest
transgressions, one becomes even more convinced of the strength of
the government’s case; simply put, there is a compelling case that
Skilling was engaged in “a conspiracy to deceive investors about the
true performance of Enron’s businesses by cooking the books to increase reported earnings, reduce reported losses, maintain an investment-grade credit rating, and improve the price of Enron’s stock.”56
Perhaps the Article simply misunderstands the case against Skilling. Tellingly, Gopalan asserts that “[c]ritical to this Article’s argument regarding moral wrongfulness and harm, Skilling was charged
not with causing the bankruptcy, but instead for misrepresenting Enron’s financial condition from 1999 to 2001.”57 But someone who has
even a passing familiarity with fraud doctrine would observe that it is
precisely misrepresentation that is the essence of fraud—I am unaware, for example, of any law that makes bankruptcy per se a crime.
To the extent that one might argue that societal harm is a prerequisite
to use the criminal law, then even by the Article’s own admission there
was wide societal harm:
Consequences for Enron’s employees and the city of Houston were
drastic. On “Black Monday,” over 4000 Houston Enron employees
lost their jobs. Over the course of the following months, thousands
more lost their jobs until the company, once Houston’s largest employer, had only enough employees to administer the bankruptcy.
Enron stock plummeted to its nadir, rendering many employees’
401(k) accounts worthless. Savings accumulated over lifetimes were
rendered naught.58

The various defenses the Article offers are unconvincing. To try to
argue that some of the losses suffered were “the byproduct of consensual risk taking”59 is puzzling—to argue that shareholders somehow
consented to the fraud would require adducing at least some evidence
to support one’s point.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 488–90.
at
at
at
at

499.
488.
487.
466.

Winter 2010]

UNEASY CASE FOR WHITE-COLLAR “MARTYRS”

517

The Article also devotes significant attention to argue that the
fact that Skilling’s reliance on organizational hierarchy and outside
advisors somehow absolves him of responsibility. The core of this twopronged claim is worth quoting at some length:
As is apparent, the sheer size of a company like Enron necessitates
the creation of large sub-structures comprising several layers of
subordinates, governance systems, and internal and outside advisors to ensure the proper structuring and vetting of business transactions and decisions. It is to these substructures that CEOs and
senior executives turn for most of the decisions they are required
to make. They act upon the basis of the advice provided by these
processes, and the success of any company is owed in substantial
measure to the efficacy of these decision-making systems. It is indeed rare for CEOs to run companies the size of Enron as personal
fiefdoms where every decision is made on their own accord and
without consultation with and reliance on advisors, internal and
external. It is also not typical that CEOs actively seek out personal
accounting or legal advice in addition to those offered by these
substructures. It makes sense then for them to rely on expert advice, and for such reliance to be useful in showing they did not
possess the required knowledge or intent to engage in criminal
conduct.60

The defense is either naive or disingenuous. It subtly ignores the quality of the organization and so-called “expert” advice—to wit, the wellknown Arthur Andersen saga.61 It shirks responsibility by suggesting
that those at the top of the organizational food chain are not responsible if they surround themselves with so-called advisors.62 One might
be well-served to remember the old proverb: “The fish always stinks
from the head downwards.”63
A final defense is that Skilling’s actions “were undertaken as a
loyal employee of Enron.”64 Gopalan claims, for instance, that:
[T]here is little morally wrongful in Skilling’s conduct. There was
no suggestion that Skilling had anything to gain at the expense of
Enron by his alleged crimes. In fact, all the evidence pointed to
60. Id. at 494; see also id. at 497 (“Is deliberate ignorance even possible in a corporation the size of Enron with its army of lawyers, accountants and consultants?”); id. at 493
(“He [Skilling] also claimed he had always relied on competent legal and accounting
advice.”).
61. See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts et al., The Fall of Andersen: Greed Tarnished Golden Reputation, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2002, at 1 (“The quiet dilution of standards and the rise of auditorsalesmen at Andersen are central to the scandals that have cost investors billions of dollars,
eliminated thousands of jobs and threatened the retirement security of millions of
citizens.”).
62. See, e.g., Robert A. Mintz, A Landmark Win over Corporate Fraud: Enron Verdict Shows
Executives Can’t Hide from Responsibility, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 26, 2006, at 23.
63. THE ROUTLEDGE BOOK OF WORLD PROVERBS 153 (2006) (Jon R. Stone ed.).
64. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 493.
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Skilling working for the success of Enron. His alleged misstatements were in the nature of sales talk and puffery and there was no
evidence that there was any intention to deceive.65

While more sophisticated, this defense too is problematic. It neglects
to mention that Skilling’s compensation was tied to Enron’s stock
price, which gave him a personal incentive to inflate the stock price
artificially. One might argue, as Gopalan seems to,66 that shareholders
would also benefit from a higher share price, but such an assertion
conveniently ignores that Skilling and other insiders were able to sell
much of their shareholdings prior to Enron’s collapse—something
which neither the public, nor rank-and-file employees were able to
do.67 And this is all before even broaching the question of whether
Skilling’s actions were driven by personal ego or were in the best longterm interests of shareholders.
Nonetheless, Gopalan is quite astute to tie his loyalty argument to
“honest services” fraud by arguing that:
There is no evidence that Skilling engaged in bribery or self dealing. Nor did he act secretly for his own benefit at the expense of
Enron. There was no deprivation of honest services because, if anything,
Skilling’s interests were too closely aligned with Enron’s. Unless the causal
link between Enron’s ultimate collapse and Skilling’s alleged actions are conclusively established, the harm was not directly caused
by Skilling’s alleged crimes.68

To be sure, there is significant controversy regarding the open-endedness of the “honest services” fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346.69 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this question in three
cases, including Skilling’s.70 But to discuss the constitutionality of a
specific statutory position is quite different than to argue that the honest services theory generally “dangerously corrodes the very basis of
65. Id. at 502–03; see also id. at 486 (“Given the nature of Skilling’s personality and
marriage to Enron’s success, there was no case that Skilling had sabotaged the company’s
interests to benefit his own.”).
66. See id. at 500 (“In fact, the immediate consequences of Skilling’s actions were that
Enron and its shareholders benefited.”).
67. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed In $1.1 Billion in Shares,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 1.
68. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme
or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services.”).
70. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, The Catchall Fraud Law that Catches Too Much, FORTUNE, Jan.
18, 2010, at 86 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has chosen to hear no fewer than three cases
this term—including [Jeff] Skilling’s and [Conrad] Black’s—that pose the question of
whether prosecutors are applying this law too broadly, and indeed, whether the law must
be struck down as unconstitutional.”).
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criminal liability by conflating moral wrongfulness with risk taking.”71
Even assuming arguendo that a majority of the Court finds Section
1346 invalid in this case, one must not forget that only one of Skilling’s convictions even refers to honest-services fraud—the other eighteen do not.72 Though no doubt Skilling’s lawyers will try to cast it as
central to Skilling’s conviction, the constitutionality of Section 1346 is
a distracting sideshow, albeit a very clever one for his defense team.
Beyond the specific defenses he enumerates, ultimately Gopalan
is critical of the punishment imposed on Skilling:
Imprisoning Skilling for 292 months then is an inappropriate tool
for what society really wants to do. Conviction ought to suffice because it serves the expressive function of the law insofar as it tells
the offender he has acted in a way that meets with society’s disapproval and conveys the consequences of such conduct to other observers. It leaves other consequences to individual members to
administer.73

Here again, though, this rhetoric leaves much to be desired. First, and
most simply, a jury convicted Skilling,74 and in our justice system the
jury serves as a proxy for the public’s moeurs. As a consequence, one
has to at least identify why what the jury did does not reflect “what
society really wants to do.” Second, and more subtly, one thrust of
Gopalan’s defense of Skilling is that “[t]he court completely confuses
Skilling’s case—he did not contend that he knew that the acts were
illegal. Rather, the claim was that he knew of the acts, which were all
legal!”75 Yet if this is true, how might shame follow from conviction?
Third, the Article argues repeatedly that Skilling’s punishment—
“292 months imprisonment, three years supervised release, and to pay
$45 million in restitution”76—was draconian. For example, according
to Gopalan, “Skilling would have had his earning capacity destroyed
by conviction alone. An order of disgorgement would have reduced
him to penury.”77 But is this necessarily so? For instance, how does the
$45 million restitution compare to Skilling’s overall financial net
71. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 502.
72. See id. at 500 (“The jury had convicted Skilling of one count of conspiracy. The
problem was that it did not specify which object of the conspiracy had been used to convict, and given that one of them was honest services, Skilling sought to overturn the conviction alleging that this was an invalid theory.”); see also Parloff, supra note 70, at 86 (“Only
one of the 19 counts of which he was convicted—the first one, charging criminal conspiracy—actually alludes to honest-services fraud.”).
73. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 485.
74. See id. at 493.
75. Id. at 498.
76. Id. at 494.
77. Id. at 503.
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worth? Finally, he notes that “[i]f Skilling was indeed responsible for
the harm, there were other avenues like civil suits to recover for the
harm caused.”78 But how and why? Would a civil suit even be possible?
Would Skilling have the assets to compensate investors for the billions
of dollars of damages caused? Such questions are eerily ignored.

III.

Minor Quibbles

I end my observations on Professor Gopalan’s Article by outlining
a few relatively minor quibbles I have with his arguments. At several
points in the Article, Gopalan makes provocative points that are
neither developed nor even backed up with sufficient citations. For
example, he claims that while “[t]his Article focuses only on a subset
of white-collar offenders[—]corporate fiduciaries abusing the principal-agent relationship[—t]he core arguments could be extended to
other kinds of white-collar crimes as well, because, in many cases, conviction without incarceration would satisfy the objectives of criminalization.”79 Yet this point is left hanging: we are neither told why nor
how his ideas could be extended.
In a similar vein, at several points in the Article, he suggests that
“conviction without incarceration offers a second-best alternative to
decriminalization.”80 Focusing the Article on his second-best alternative may be fine as far as it goes, but it is odd not to spend any time
discussing one’s first-best alternative, especially when the self-proclaimed overarching question of the Article is “whether such agency
problems should be the subject matter of criminal law with imprisonment as the sanction or whether they are better suited to civil or social
sanctions.”81 To belabor the obvious, whether or not to treat an infraction as criminal or not is an analytically different question than what
remedy the criminal law should seek. As scholars have pointed out,
labeling an activity as “criminal” provides an important signaling function to the public,82 not to mention that legislation often includes
78. Id.
79. Id. at 465.
80. Id. at 504; see also id. at 463 (“Part II argues that conviction without imprisonment
is a second-best alternative to decriminalization in cases where the conduct is blameworthy,
and results in non-consensual harm.”); id. at 474 (“For conduct without the taint of moral
wrongfulness, but where non-consensual harm results, criminalization without incarceration is the second-best alternative to decriminalization.”).
81. Id. at 465.
82. See, e.g., Ball & Friedman, supra note 28, at 211 (“Labeling conduct as ‘criminal’
may change the public attitude toward the man who breaks the law as well as the attitudes
of those who are themselves tempted to break the law.”).
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criminal sanctions as a reservoir from which to mete out punishment
for more serious infractions, rather than as a first-line instrument of
public policy.83 Perhaps more philosophically, as Harry Ball and Lawrence Friedman have argued using the simple example of usury, declaring something a crime represents “a legislative judgment that it
was best to socialize remedial action . . . because under existing social
conditions civil enforcement had failed.”84 To the extent that
Gopalan’s first-best alternative, decriminalization, would suggest these
issues are not important, the Article might be well served to tell its
readers why.
Another provocative claim is that the criminal law “punishes people for actions that are not even civil wrongs, let alone undertaken
with the taint of moral wrongfulness.”85 Given the reality that for all
but rare strict liability violations, criminal prosecution requires a showing of mens rea—not to mention that “proof and evidentiary requirements are more onerous in criminal prosecutions than in civil
suits”86—such an assertion requires significantly more explanation.
Tellingly, the source Gopalan cites to in support of his point is considerably more nuanced, even to the point of arguing that “because the
more expansive reach of criminal liability is arguably consistent with
many of the theories underlying the civil-criminal divide, Congress
should consider carefully whether to expand the reach of criminal
liability . . . .”87 Even more simply, if Gopalan’s first-best solution is to
decriminalize a category of actions, which are not actionable civilly,
then is he advocating no legal remedy?
After all, as the source he himself cites to is careful to observe,
“[a]s a consequence of the narrow scope of private civil liability, investors who are injured by criminally actionable conduct are often uncompensated.”88 Indeed, federal statutes and federal common law
have made it increasingly difficult to bring private securities antifraud
lawsuits. The legislative story dates from a triad of securities reform
statutes passed in the mid-1990s. First, in 1995 the Private Securities
83. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 426 (1963) (“Furthermore, implicit
in the legislative scheme is the conception of the criminal sanction as a last resort to be
used selectively and discriminatingly when other sanctions fail.”).
84. Ball & Friedman, supra note 28, at 213.
85. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 461.
86. Kadish, supra note 83, at 442.
87. Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
88. Id. at 39.
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Reform Litigation Act introduced, “inter alia, heightened pleading requirements for class actions alleging fraud in the sale of national securities.”89 One year later, in 1996, the National Securities Market
Improvements Act (“NSMIA”) whose “primary purpose . . . was to preempt state ‘Blue Sky’ laws which required issuers to register many securities with state authorities prior to marketing in the state,”90 was
passed. Third, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in
1998 made “federal court the exclusive venue for class actions alleging
fraud in the sale of certain covered securities and by mandating that
such class actions be governed exclusively by federal law.”91 Through
heightened pleading standards and the preemption of more generous
state securities laws, Congress has made it increasingly difficult for private plaintiffs to bring securities actions.92
Federal common law has evolved into a more defendant-friendly
posture as well. Beginning with two landmark cases in 1975—Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug93 and Cort v. Ash94—the U.S. Supreme Court has
by and large cabined the federal common law of securities fraud. Over
the past five years and in rapid succession, the Court has placed restrictions on plaintiffs along two principal dimensions. Decisions such
as Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,95 Tellabs v. Makor Issues and
Rights,96 and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.97 move in the direction of imposing heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs. Moreover, opinions such as Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit98 and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
89. Lander v. Hartford Life, 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); see also A.C. Pritchard,
Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 481–83 (2000).
90. Lander, 251 F.3d at 108. The securities exempted, called “covered securities,” are
those nationally listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, or on NASDAQ. See
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2006). Note, however, that the “NSMIA expressly preserved state authority to bring enforcement actions with respect to securities transactions.” Stefania A. Di
Trollio, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and
the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1295 (2004).
91. Lander, 251 F.3d at 108.
92. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism 6, 51 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 23,
2004 and Geo. Univ, L, Ctr., Bus., Econ. & Reg. Pol’y, Research Paper No. 606481, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=606481.
93. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
94. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
95. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
96. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
97. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
98. 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
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Billings99 have effectively given broad preemptive effect to the federal
securities regime, to the detriment of state securities and antitrust law,
respectively.
Curiously missing from the Article, however, is any treatment of
these developments that have dramatically diminished the ability of
private plaintiffs to seek civil remedies. For instance, to the extent that
Gopalan might support these developments, perhaps he is content to
let the administrative agencies such as the SEC—to which the restrictions on private plaintiffs do not apply—seek civil sanctions?100 To the
extent he does not support these restrictions, might his call for
decriminalization be coupled with advocacy for fewer restrictions on
private plaintiffs? Regardless, readers are left wondering.
Beyond its underdeveloped points, and at the risk of being overly
nit-picky, I also permit myself to point out at least two inconsistencies
in the Article’s arguments: one with regard to public moeurs; the
other, with regard to the power of principals—notably, shareholders
in a corporation—over their agents. Especially toward the beginning
of the piece, Gopalan makes it a point to emphasize again and again
how strongly the public desires punishment for white-collar offenders.
He laments “the popular perception that white-collar criminals are
not punished enough”101 and the “societal turn to vengeance.”102 Citing specific examples, the reader is told the following:
Despite the long sentences alleged wrongdoers like Jeff Skilling of
Enron, Bernie Ebbers of Worldcom, and Joseph Nacchio of Qwest
have received, popular opinion remains that the law is too lenient
on this class of offenders. The retributive impulse of the mob’s baying for blood after Enron’s collapse was not sated by the untimely
death of Ken Lay shortly after his conviction . . . .103

Overall, Gopalan notes that there is a “growing public opinion that
corporate wrongdoers must be equated with ordinary criminals and
that incarceration is necessary.”104 Consider how different this stance
99. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
100. Again, this is an issue the source he cites does broach. See Couture, supra note 87,
at 38 (“In sum, the gap between criminal liability and SEC enforcement liability is smaller
than the gap between criminal liability and private civil liability, but the gap nonetheless
exists.”).
101. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 459.
102. Id. at 460.
103. Id. at 459–60.
104. Id. at 473; see also id. at 468 (“The popular perception that CEOs and senior corporate executives are greedy and arrogant is probably at the root of the visceral reactions to
news reports about alleged acts of wrongdoing.”).
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is with that espoused later in the Article. There, we are told that actually society would like something different:
Imprisonment and fine sanctions are crude in their application
and do not serve to convey the emotions aroused by the actions of
corporate offenders. Frequently, for most indirect, non-dangerous
offenses, all that society wants is that these emotions be ventilated,
and for the offender to be prevented from re-offending rather
than to see the offender go to jail or be made to suffer financial
loss. . . . Civilized society recognizes that the CEO’s conduct is not
worthy of jail time, and that fines are crude matches for their
actions.105

A skeptic could be forgiven for wondering how, after a few pages, society’s desires are magically transformed.
There is a similar tension between the early and later parts of the
Article when discussing the power that principals, such as shareholders, have over their agents—the board of directors and officers that
supervise and manage corporations. Early on appears an elaborate
and eloquent discussion of the powerlessness of the principals in corporate law:
The principal-agent relationship is especially pregnant with potential for abuse because of its inherently asymmetric nature. Agents
are primarily employed in order to make up for the gaps in expertise, skill, and time that prevent principals from accomplishing the
delegated tasks on their own. . . . [¶] [W]hen applied at the corporate level, the collectivization of the principal creates incentives for
free riding and rational apathy. . . . These factors debilitate the
monitoring power of principals to a point where the agent is the de
facto master of the relationship. Thus, although in theory the
shareholders are the principals, it is the management that exercises the greater power, primarily because of real barriers to removal caused by collective action problems and the deference that
corporate law accords to business decisions taken by
management.106

This point is important as far as it goes, and has a rich intellectual
tradition behind it, beginning in modern times with the seminal work
of Berle and Means.107 Regrettably, though, later in the Article, the
tone changes when trying to argue that the criminal law should not be
applied to principal-agent problems:
As is typically used in the criminal law, “criminal harm” can involve
bodily harm as well as social harm involving collective losses. The
first kind is unproblematic, and the validity of the state’s criminal105. Id. at 484–85 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 465.
107. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
VATE PROPERTY (1932).
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ization of such conduct is not seriously disputed. The second might
also be acceptable in cases where the harm is non-consensual and
involves third parties suffering without the ability to avoid the
harm. However, no such necessity exists in situations involving agency
problems, as the principals have tools at their disposal to control the wrongdoers. There are perfectly adequate civil and social sanctions that
can achieve the objectives—incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence—at much lower cost. Principals can act in concert, use regulators like the SEC, or act through intermediaries like stock
exchanges and institutional shareholders to do any of these without the state incurring imprisonment expenses.108

Yet how can the principals on the one hand be powerless, yet at
the same time achieve astonishingly ambitious goals? Being more consistent, or at least making an attempt to explain the inconsistencies,
would make Gopalan’s argument more convincing.
Finally, in terms of minor issues, I remain unconvinced by the
examples that Gopalan provides—to the point where they might even
weaken rather than strengthen his argument. Consider first his attempt to present accounting as a field that does not require moral
judgments: “[f]requently, the conduct alleged to be wrong involves
accounting transactions without any evidence about the offender’s expertise in accountancy. The accounting rules often do not have any
moral element, and are explained more as coordination devices
rather than moral guidelines.”109 To be sure, he is making such an
assertion to bring accounting violations within his framework of
agency crimes that lack moral wrongfulness. But it is a breathtaking
statement to anyone with even a passing familiarity of accounting—
consider, for example, an entire sub-field in accounting grappling
with the ethical and moral issues its profession faces.110 To make
things even more puzzling, Gopalan states that “accounting rules
often do not have any moral element, and are explained more as coordination devices rather than as moral guidelines.”111 Yet perhaps
the opposite is true: it is precisely within the interstitial spaces of accounting that morality becomes of paramount importance.
108. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 473; see also id. at 483 (“White-collar offenders have a
variety of agents who can impose shaming and other social sanctions including investors,
other directors, employees, the media, politicians, and potential employers. Their position
relative to the offender reduces the risk of retaliation by the offender and facilitates
internalization.”).
109. Id. at 469.
110. See, e.g., RONALD F. DUSKA ET AL., ACCOUNTING ETHICS (2003); STEVEN MINTZ &
ROSELYN MORRIS, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING IN ACCOUNTING (2007); DAN
GUY ET AL., THE CPA’S GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2000).
111. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 469.
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His offhand critique of charging defendants with so-called “process crimes” such as obstruction of justice requires significantly more
development. Consider his observation that:
The employment of criminal law to combat agency abuses is particularly troubling when the state is content to criminalize based on
alleged obstructions of justice rather than proving the underlying
allegations. The cases of Martha Stewart and Frank Quattrone are
illustrative of this trend.112

But if one were to hew to the framework advanced in his Article,
would it be fair to presume that Gopalan would somehow consider
lying to a prosecutor not “morally wrongful”? If so, then such a novel
argument should be spelled out. Stepping outside the Article’s construct, whether one believes prosecutors have been overly zealous in
pursuing process crimes deserves more than an offhand comment
with no relevant citations—there is, after all, an emerging literature
on the subject.113
An arguably more troubling example is the Article’s casual treatment of insider trading law. Critiquing what it apparently views as current insider trading jurisprudence, the “abstain-or-disclose” rule114 the
discussion then proceeds to postulate “it is unlikely that the person
who is purchasing the securities from the insider is being taken advantage of in every situation. It is possible that the buyer sold the securities also before the information surfaced and caused the stock price to
fall.”115 No empirical evidence is adduced to support this claim.
Gopalan then continues:
If it is assumed that the argument is that the entire market is being
taken advantage of, even that does not suffice as a strong case for
criminalization because in many cases the size of the sale of the
securities by the insider might be small in relation to the market
for securities of the relevant company, with the result that the consequences are de minimis.116

112. Id. at 466 (footnotes omitted).
113. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9
(2005); Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J.
1435 (2009).
114. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 470. This rule, developed by the SEC and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, requires anyone trading on material, non-public information either to “abstain” from trading or “disclose” the material non-public information.
It is sometimes referred to as the “equal access” rule. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
115. Gopalan, supra note 1, at 471.
116. Id.
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After all, according to him, “there is a body of scholarship contending
that insider trading is actually beneficial to the market because it unearths vital information.”117
These assertions might surprise those versed in modern insider
trading law. To begin with, the U.S. Supreme Court has never accepted the “abstain or disclose” rule,118 except in the specific context
of insider trading associated with tender offers.119 Instead, the Court
has adopted the misappropriation theory, treating insider trading as a
species of fraud; in other words, “[i]n lieu of premising liability on a
fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or
seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”120 More generally, misappropriation theory can be viewed as an extension of larceny
offenses121—even analogized to embezzlement, as the O’Hagan Court
itself does.122 Needless to say, insider trading conceptualized as theft is
a far cry from insider trading as a governance offense that is somehow
not morally wrongful, which is presumably the picture Gopalan is trying to paint.
Furthermore, the “clear body of scholarship” is a citation to
Henry Manne, who apparently believes that “insider trading can be
used as an important component of executive compensation,”123 that
“insider trading contributed importantly to the efficiency of stock
market pricing”124—and who, above all, surmises that “investors
would want every bit of market price information they could possibly
get, whether it came from stock trading by insiders or the devil.”125
What such bold assertions conveniently forget is that an overarching
117. Id. at 470.
118. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
119. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666–77 (1997).
120. Id. at 652.
121. Cf. Kadish, supra note 83, at 425 (“The extension of the classic larceny offense by
courts and legislatures to embrace fraud, embezzlement, and similar varieties of misappropriation that threatened newly developing ways of transacting business is a well documented chapter in the history of the criminal law.”).
122. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 (“A company’s confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the company has right of exclusive use.
The undisclosed misappropriation of this information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the
Court said in Carpenter, constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement . . . .” (citations omitted)).
123. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not
Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (2005).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 181.
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goal of the securities laws, articulated in section 2 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, is “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”126 The ability of insiders to trade on material non-public
information is an affront to that goal. As the Court observes in
O’Hagan:
[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is
unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-àvis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems
from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.127

In the end, the insider trading example—much like the accounting and obstruction of justice examples—are simply not credible without significantly further development. As such, they perhaps further
hinder Gopalan’s treatment, rather than help it.

Conclusion
Having spent the bulk of this Essay highlighting my unease with
Professor Gopalan’s thesis, I end by agreeing wholeheartedly with him
on a broader point. As he correctly points out, it is quite sad to observe the increasing reliance that lawmakers have had to place on the
criminal law—as just one example of this phenomenon, “of the approximately 3000 crimes in the federal statute books, over 1200 were
created since 1970.”128 Not to mention the concomitant cost to society—both financial and emotional—of the criminal justice system, notably, its prisons.129 But I remain unconvinced that decriminalizing a
category of white-collar offenses, or not imprisoning its offenders, is a
solution to these deep social woes.
The problem is, unfortunately, much deeper. Consider one commentator’s perceptive analysis of the Enron saga:
The cultural problem revealed by Enron ultimately is not subject to
correction by teaching lawyers more accounting, fine tuning rules
governing the use of “gatekeepers” in corporate matters, or requiring and expecting more from independent directors, though all
these measures would help in a small way. The problem is that corporate and legal culture has lost all sense of right and wrong.
Norms of business behavior have evolved so that compliance with
126.
127.
128.
129.
savings

15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2006).
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658–59.
Gopalan, supra note 1, at 460.
See, e.g., id. at 462 (The model proposed by the Article “would yield significant
by reducing prison costs . . . .”).
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the positive law is the sole standard of ethical conduct—a role for
which the positive law is ill-suited.130

Similarly, the dean of one prominent business school argues convincingly that the business community needs to develop more managers
who are better citizens:
If we [business schools] want to attract applicants who aren’t just
future perp-walk stars, we must show them that we too have learned
from the recent scandals. Rather than just giving students tools
they can use to game the system, we must inspire them to become
true professionals, with aspirations that go well beyond greed.131

How should society achieve these lofty objectives? To the extent they
involve “the cultivation of the sentiment of moral disapproval,”132
then Gopalan’s thesis—which comes close to preaching a form of
moral relativism—cuts precisely the wrong way.
In a better world, we should heed Amitai Etzioni’s advice to place
emphasis “on the formation of preferences side, via moral education,
peer culture, community values, and the mobilization of appropriate
public opinion . . . .”133 But we are regrettably not there yet, and in the
interim need to rely on the positive law—carrots, sticks, and all—as
the expressive arbiter of right and wrong134 and even facilitator of positive social norms.135 As political scientist James Q. Wilson has observed, when it comes to public policy, we unfortunately do not
inhabit a world of “Big Answers to Big Questions”;136 rather, we need
130. William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 BUS. L. 961, 962–63 (2003).
131. Richard L. Schmalensee, The ‘Thou Shalt’ School of Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
2003, at B4. What Robert Lane observed in 1953 remains unfortunately still true today:
Since violation is a product, in part, of social pressure and community attitudes,
government and business should jointly seek to build respect for law—even distasteful law enforced by a repugnant administration. Government cannot do this
alone; business cannot do this without a record of fair dealing by the government.
It is a task for both elements of society.
Robert E. Lane, Why Business Men Violate the Law, 44 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
151, 154 (1953).
132. Kadish, supra note 83, at 439.
133. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 242 (1988).
134. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1502–03 (2002) (“When Congress outlaws racial discrimination or insider trading, people’s views of the acceptability and even
morality of those actions change. One theory is that legislation changes what people believe about approval patterns in their society and because people value approval, their new
beliefs affect their behavior.”).
135. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 400 (1997) (suggesting “two specific ways that statutes create and strengthen
norms: (1) lawmaking publicizes a societal consensus, and (2) law provides the concrete
norms that define compliance with internalized abstract norms”).
136. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 375 (1989).
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to find ways “to allow imperfect people to use flawed procedures to
cope with insoluble problems.”137 The use of the criminal law, including imprisonment, is regrettably one of these flawed procedures,
though I fervently hope someday we will be able to do better.

137. Id.

